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ABSTRACT
Within any industry, firms typically produce related products over multiple subse-
quent periods in an attempt to build consumer loyalty and achieve continued sales.
Apple releases new iPhones and car companies produce new models every year, re-
lying on consumers believing each new product is of high quality. Firms rely on the
spillover effects from previous markets, where firms are able to more easily demon-
strate their product’s quality to the consumers before purchase. The goal is to find a
range of prices which allows the high quality firm to distinguish its type to consumers
via the price pH and if spillover effects in subsequent markets can occur. We look at
a duopoly of two firms, of high and low qualities, where each firm produces a product
in an initial market and a second, related product in a subsequent market. Using
each firm’s expected profits, based on Bayesian probabilities, we analyze a firm’s
mimicking strategy to find the range of pH that allows for a separating equilibrium
and spillover effects. In a second market where firms are the same qualities as in
the first market, the high quality firm experiences spillover effects and can signal its
quality with a lower price than in the first market. When firms change qualities in
the second market, no spillover effect occurs and the newly high quality firm must
increase pH from the previous market in order to separate.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Within any industry, it is very rare for a firm to produce a single product in a single
period (also called the market) and then leave the industry entirely. Most firms will
produce related products over multiple subsequent markets in an attempt to build
consumer loyalty and achieve continued sales. Apple has shown this with the release
of yearly iPhone models. Car companies like Ford and Toyota release new models each
year to drive sales. In most markets, consumers are initially unaware of the product’s
quality until after they have purchased and used the product. Because of this, firms
must find a way to signal their product’s quality to consumers and ensure that they
are able to sell higher quality goods at higher prices. If a firm, such as Apple, wishes
to get some sort of control within an industry over many periods/markets they will
want to convince consumers they produce strictly high quality products.
The high quality firms will need to separate themselves from the lower quality
firms and allow consumers to identify their products as high quality before purchas-
ing them. The prices charged by each type of firm will constitute a revealing, or
separating, equilibrium where the high quality firm is able to reveal its true quality to
consumers. By having consumers perceive their products as high quality, firms should
be able to take advantage of their reputation and achieve separation in subsequent
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markets. If the high quality firms are unable to reveal their quality, the low quality
firms can take advantage of the product quality ambiguity and their lower price to
sell to more consumers.
When product quality is unobservable before purchase a firm will necessarily
charge a price above the marginal cost, the cost of producing an additional unit
[1, 2, 3]. For Bertrand competition where firms select prices and consumers determine
the quantity to purchase, firms have positive expected profits when either the rivals’
marginal cost is unknown [2], or the number of firms is unknown [3].
If a high quality firm can reveal its type across multiple stages and multiple
products, the firm can take advantage of spillover effects (see Appendix B). Think of
this as being well liked by a teacher because they enjoyed teaching your older sibling.
If spillover effects are present, the firm can take advantage of any previous market
results and adjust its pricing strategy accordingly. Its the idea of a firm using its
reputation because of previous results that motivates why this study is important.
Bagwell and Riordan [4] looked at how charging an unnecessarily high initial
price affects a high quality firm’s ability to reveal its true quality to consumers across
subsequent markets. A demand function was determined, based on a firm’s type
(quality), price chosen, and the beliefs of consumers. The demand function created a
horizontal parabola as a function of the ratio of informed to uninformed consumers.
Any price inside of the parabola would lead to the low quality firm attempting to
mimic high quality - charging a price expected to be from a high quality firm. By
charging a price which is too high to be profitable, the high quality firm is able to
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reveal its type in an initial market and take advantage of the spillover effects - they
can charge lower prices in subsequent markets and still be able to separate from any
low quality firms [4, 5].
If a high quality firm can still signal their quality while being able to use a
lower price than before, they have an incentive to charge a higher separating price
in the initial market to allow the signaling price to fall over subsequent markets.
Therefore looking at using price as a signal over multiple markets has real applications
to many industries, especially in technology and automotive markets.
Another paper written by Bester and Demuth [6] looked at price competition
involving a duopoly between an incumbent and entrant firm are the only two firms.
They assume the incumbent is fully informed, while consumers are uninformed, of
the entrant firm’s quality. Their model utilized reaction functions - functions that
determine the best reaction price to the prices chosen by rivals - and found that the
entrant firm may not have to distort its price to signal its true quality.
Baye and Harbaugh [7] discussed a monopolistic firm which produces two
products of differing qualities. Instead of looking at a market with multiple firms
they focused on a scenario involving one firm that produces two products, one of
“good” and one of “best” quality, in a single market. The interest of the paper lies in
whether a single firm selling products of different qualities gives the same profits as
it would if each product was sold by a different firm. When product types cannot be
observed, Baye and Harbaugh found that there is no qualitative difference between a
single producer with multiple products and a multi-firm market where each produces
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one product. Therefore, their findings ideas can influence the creation and evaluation
of our model.
A comparative price signaling equilibrium was also considered, which was
defined as an equilibrium where consumers infer a product’s quality through the
observation of both prices. This allows the consumers to base their decisions on the
pair of prices, rather than just the price of the single good. Baye and Harbaugh
found that if consumers wish to purchase less of the higher priced product, there is
no need to raise the price of the high quality product above the full-information price.
The price for the high quality product must be set to guarantee equilibrium demand
for the high quality good does not exceed that for the low quality good. The same
condition is true for a firm that faces interdependent demands.
Janssen and Dubovik [8] studied an oligopolistic market (only a small number
of firms) in which heterogeneous information about prices and product quality exists.
They assumed three groups on consumers exist where they consumers know both the
product prices and quality, know only prices, or know neither price nor quality. Firms
play a mixed strategy, meaning they randomize their price selections, over a curve
of price-quality combinations. The equilibrium is characterized by better price and
quality combinations being associated with lower prices.
Daughety and Reinganum [9] looked at price competition among firms pro-
ducing products which differ in costs and consumer satisfaction (valuation). By using
profit functions which chooses the best response to its rivals’ strategies, as well as
providing a price which makes mimicking less profitable. They found that the incom-
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plete information (the quality of a firm’s product is private information known only
by the firm itself) causes both qualities of firms to charge higher prices than in the
full information game.
In an oligopoly where firms are either of high or low quality, Janssen and Roy
[10] show that a certain price charged by a high quality firm will allow them to signal
their quality and provide a symmetric fully-revealing (separating) equilibrium. The
range of reasonable prices for each type of firm is known as its price support, which
is usually determined by factors of production. For example, the price support for
the high quality firm is bounded by consumer valuations and the firms’ production
costs. The research found that because of out-of-equilibrium beliefs, neither type
of firm could gain through charging prices outside of the price supports. Therefore,
mimicking was not a profitable option for either type of firm. In this case, it was
noted that the price support changed based on the percentage of consumers who
choose to buy a good. The magnitude of this change is determined by how different
the price is from the consumer valuation of a high quality product. They were able
to find that, under certain conditions, a symmetric fully-revealing equilibrium exists
where low quality firms play a mixed strategy of prices within the low quality price
support while high quality firms all charge a common deterministic price.
Janssen and Roy also briefly discussed pooling equilibria, which would occur
when the price supports for the low and high quality firms are not disjoint.1 This
1After refining these equilibria using the D1 Criterion, Janssen and Roy found that none of these
equilibria survive.
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means that there is at least one price, or a range of prices, which lies within the price
support for both a low and high quality firm. A price in this interval could feasibly
be chosen by both quality of firms without being part of a mimicking strategy. We
necessarily need the price supports to be disjoint in a separating equilibrium, where
firms are prevented from fooling consumers by mimicking another firm type’s pricing
strategy. This would not provide any type of signal to the consumer, which gives a
pooling equilibria where neither type is revealed via prices to the consumer before
purchase. Therefore if the price supports shared an interval that were viable for both
types of firms to charge, a pooling equilibrium could occur.
In addition to using price as a signal, many prior studies have chosen to
include advertising levels as a signal as well. Advertising allows firms to introduce
their products to the consumers before they see a price tag in the store. Any level
of advertising leads to additional direct costs to the firms, so its use as a signal is
certainly plausible. By spending money on advertising in hopes that it will draw a
larger consumer base and increase sales, firms can potentially use their advertisement
expenditure to signal that their product is high quality.
A study done by Paul Milgrom and John Roberts [11] was based on repeat
sales where both price and advertising are variable and may potentially be used as
signals. Milgrom and Roberts used sequential equilibria, where a sequence of signals
is being sent to slowly allow for the type to be observed by the consumer. The
analysis used profit as a function of price, beliefs, and advertisement. It was found
that a non-zero level of advertising was not viable for the low quality firm, and that a
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positive high quality advertising level could allow for a separating equilibrium. Some
of the separating equilibria will be refined using the Intuitive Criterion as defined by
Cho and Kreps [12]. In addition to separating equilibria, pooling equilibria can exist
but will not survive the Intuitive Criterion.
As an addition to the previous analysis done in [11], Linnemer [13] extended
the research to durable goods which do not generate immediate repeat purchases.
Some examples of durable goods include houses and cars. Instead of looking at
multiple firms, Linnemer focused on a monopoly which produces either a high quality
or low quality good. It was shown that a high price paired with dissipative advertising
(advertising that is dispersed slowly after initial release) will provide an efficient
signal. However, when the proportion of informed consumers is low, quality can be
signaled only through setting a high price.
Also following the work done in [11], Fluet and Garella [14] looked at both
monopoly and duopoly markets where advertising and prices were used as signals.
They wanted to determine the issue, if any, of using price or advertising to signal
quality. Additionally, Fluet and Garella wanted to find whether advertising has a
positive or negative effect on a firm’s profit and signaling ability. After constructing
expected profit functions following ideas used in [11], they found that the level of
advertising depends on the difference in magnitude of the firm qualities (i.e. how much
better is the high quality product than the low quality one?). When there is little
difference between the two qualities advertising is necessary to invoke a separating
equilibrium, while a large difference leads to smaller advertising levels. Signaling
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through high prices is costly when rivals are able to take away the market share
(number of consumers who purchase the high quality good) of the high priced firm.
Hao Zhao [15] wanted to find the optimal pricing and advertising strategies of
a firm when introducing a new product to uninformed consumers. After determining
a demand function with inputs of advertising and price, Zhao considered two cases:
when consumers know the product’s quality before buying, and where consumers
are uncertain. When the quality is known by consumers, the high quality firm will
advertise more than the low quality firm if it is more efficient in producing high
quality goods. In the case where consumers are uncertain, the high quality firm
will is willing to advertise instead of being perceived as low quality. Therefore, in a
separating equilibrium the high quality firm will spend less on advertising and charge
a higher price. If the firm has a truly high quality product, it should allow price to
be the signal and only conduct modest advertising.
In a paper written by Makoto Abe [16], price and advertising levels were
used as signals in a single market study between a national brand and a private-label
clone.2 Abe studied both separating and pooling equilibria where national brands
were able to set themselves apart from the clone company through setting unique
levels of both price and advertising. Abe used the firms’ utility functions to describe
the utility (profit) a firm receives based on the sales it has for a given price and
advertisement level.
2A national brand can be thought of as the “name brand” product, where the private-label clone
is similar to a “knock-off”.
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In discussing the conditions for separating equilibria, both envy and non-envy
situations were considered where the low quality firm wishes to deviate and pretend
to be high quality or not deviate respectively. In the envy case, where the low quality
firm would be willing to deviate, the high quality firm can separate with any positive
level of advertising a0 that would reduce the low quality firm’s profits. It was found
that unique levels of price and advertising by both low and high quality firms can
provide a unique separating equilibrium in both the envy and non-envy situations.
Additionally, pooling and hybrid equilibria (see Appendix B) were discussed.
In an approach similar to the separating case, these equilibria were found to exist.
Upon further refinement by the Intuitive Criterion (see Appendix B) as defined by
Cho and Kreps, none of these equilibria survive and therefore are not discussed at
length. In conclusion, Abe found that only a single unique separating equilibrium of
advertising levels and prices survived the intuitive Criterion.
Finally, Pires and Catala˜o-Lopes [17] focused on advertising expenditure as
the signaling device, in a multi-product economy in which products are sequentially
released in the market. Using gross profit functions (expected profits minus the
level of advertising expenditure) as the payoffs of the firms, Pires and Catala˜o-Lopes
compared the maximum difference in profits from mimicking and discussed the equi-
librium possibilities for the first market. In the first market it was found that the
type of equilibrium, either pooling or separating, was dependent on the distribution
of types within the market (i.e. the probability that the firm was of high or low
quality).
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In the second stage, Pires and Catala˜o-Lopes used a correlation coefficient, a
number between zero and one, to relate the qualities of the goods between the first
and second markets. The closer the coefficient was to one, the more likely the second
product was to have the same quality as the first. The addition of the correlation
was crucial to creating a realistic setup to study any information spillovers for any
subsequent markets.
The second market contained two possible scenarios: where the quality of
the first product was observed before purchasing the second product, and where
the quality of the first product was not observed in time for the second product to
be released. Both of these cases can occur in a real market place, especially with
durable goods (houses, cars, etc.) where the quality may not become apparent before
the next model is released. In the situation where quality was observed, the second
market acted just as the first market - there was no consequence, or spillover effect,
of advertising expenditure used in the first market. However when the quality of the
first good is not observed, the equilibria in the second market varied depending on
the level of the correlation coefficient and initial distribution of firm types.
The following research will be a mixture of the papers discussed above. A
duopoly (where two firms sell to the entire market) will be used, where each firm is
either of high or low quality. We assume that each firm produces a product of the
same quality as the firm itself - a high quality firm produces a high quality product,
and vice versa. Therefore, a firm is only able to produce a product which matches
its quality - a low quality firm cannot produce a high quality good, for example.
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Because consumers are typically unable to observe the total amount of ad-
vertising or observe different levels of advertising, we choose to only use price as a
signal and neglect the effects of advertising. The price of a product is always ob-
served and is ideally the same across consumers, making price a more accurate and
controllable signal for the firms to use. The previous literature mentioned above has
dealt with either price or a mixture of advertisement and price as a signal in only
one market. Only one paper [17] discussed signaling via advertising and prices in two
related markets.
The goal of our research is to find conditions based on firm costs and con-
sumer valuations that will guarantee the existence of a separating equilibrium in two
sequential duopolistic markets. We will use the same structure and assumptions as
the single market model used in [10]. This model will then be adapted to a second
market, utilizing the updated probabilities found via the correlations coefficient from
[17]. This will be done for two related markets in which the firms are actively trying
to sell a product.
The basic assumptions and single stage model creation (Chapter 3) come
from the [10] and follow the same guidelines. As part of the equilibrium analysis,
we must consider each quality of firm’s incentives to mimic, and out-of-equilibrium
beliefs. By discussing the out-of-equilibrium beliefs of the consumers, we are able to
identify whether a firm is able to effectively fool consumers through mimicking a firm
of the opposite quality. This culminates in the consumers identifying a mimicking
firm, and adjusting their purchase strategy if possible.
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The mimicry analysis be done using the same expected profit comparisons
that Janssen and Roy used. The expected profits used will be based on those from
[10], with slight adjustments, as discussed in Chapter 3. Using the probability that
the other firms are of high quality, a firm can determine its expected profit at both
a high and low quality price. A comparison of these two expected profits can then
be used to determine whether mimicking (charging a price within the price support
of the opposite quality firm) is beneficial. If deviating to such a price results in a
higher expected profit, the firm will choose to mimic. If deviating results in a lower
expected profit, the firm will use a price indicative of its true quality.
When looking at the second stage, we will extend the single stage model used
in [10] to include a second market (period) via the correlation coefficient used in
[17]. We will assume that the first market ends in a separating equilibrium, allowing
consumers and firms to observe the quality of all products from the first market.
At the beginning of the second market, we derive the new expected profits
of each quality of firm by adjusting the probability that a firm is high quality. This
is done through the correlation coefficient. A firm is believed to be high quality in
the second market with higher probability if they were revealed to be high quality
in the previous market. Likewise, being revealed as low quality reduces consumer
confidence that the firm is high quality in the second market - they are believed to
be high quality with less probability than in the first market.
The rest of the paper will be structured as follows. The model and basic
assumptions will be discussed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 will examine the three pos-
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sibilities of the single market case, where the separating equilibria will be presented.
A model for the second market will be discussed in Chapter 5. Two cases will be
considered, where the firms do not change qualities and the case where they both
change types. These will be covered in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 respectively. Chapter 6
will provide numerical examples to demonstrate the theoretical work and its applica-
tion to real scenarios. Chapter 7 will review our findings and suggest possibilities for
future research.
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CHAPTER II
BAYESIAN GAME DESCRIPTION
A Bayesian Game relies on imperfect information and the use of Bayesian probabilities
to find an equilibrium. The imperfect information typically stems from the imbalance
of information about a player. In our case, the players are the firms which are active
in the market. The imperfect information comes from the firms knowing only their
own qualities and costs; they don’t know this information about the other firm.
This gives us a signaling game in which a high quality firm’s profit relies on
its ability to signal its quality to consumers while deterring low quality firms from
mimicking them. The stronger the signal, in our case a price, the more likely it is
that the firm can distinguish itself above the other firm and separate from firms of
different qualities. The goal of our signaling game is to find constraints which will
provide a separating equilibrium that allows consumers to observe a product’s quality
before purchase and prevent firms from pretending to be of a different quality.
Many times the source of the imperfect information is assumed as part of
nature. Nature is seen as a separate player which assigns a type (quality) to each
player. Nature plays no other role than to ‘choose’ the qualities of our firms, which is
based on the probability a firm is of high quality. If there are multiple stages Nature
can assign types for both firms and for all steps at the beginning, or assign types to
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the firms at the beginning of each stage. In our game, the firms are assigned a quality
(low or high) as their type from this probability. They both produce a product of the
quality they are as assigned by the probability (Nature).
Each player (firm) needs to make decisions based on educated guesses. The
uncertainty within the game because of imperfect information causes the firms to
use expected profits (based off of the probability other firms are of high quality) to
make decisions (mimicking strategy and price choices). These decisions are the key
to finding the Bayesian Perfect Equilibrium of the game - a set of one high quality
and one low quality price that would be played, resulting in consumers purchasing
products and ending the current market (period).
The firms simultaneously select the price which they wish to charge in the
first market, based on their true quality and chosen mimicking strategy. As the
firms choose their strategies and release products with chosen prices into the market,
consumers decide from which firm to purchase. The consumers, upon observing the
prices, may adjust their prior beliefs, or priori, about the qualities of the firms. This
updating is done via Bayes’ Rule (see Appendix B).
The consumers then decide which price to pay based on their beliefs. If the
high quality firm can provide a strong enough pricing signal, consumers will become
informed of the product types even before purchase. This gives what is called a
revealing or separating equilibrium, because the firms qualities are revealed to the
consumers. If the signal is not strong enough, we will have a pooling equlibrium
where product qualities are not revealed.
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A high quality firm being able to charge a price to induce a separating equilib-
rium will allow consumers to purchase a high quality good which is certainly preferred
over a low quality good. If they are able to purchase a high quality product at a price
which is below their valuation of the good, the consumer will feel as they found a
bargain. Therefore, they will benefit from the price being below their maximum
valuation.
If not, consumers are unable to discern the product types before purchase
which leads to a pooling equilibrium (all qualities are pooled together). In a pooling
equilibrium, consumers are unable to tell which type of product they are paying for.
Additionally, consumers may receive a product of the opposite quality they intended
to purchase if a firm was able to mimic another. Therefore, consumers will choose to
pay the lower price of the two in order to minimize their displeasure if the product
turns out to be of low quality.
If the game has only one stage, all players earn a payoff after this step and
Bayesian Nash Equilibria (BNE) can be refined through the use of any chosen crite-
rion. We use the Intuitive Criterion as outlined in [12]. The refining of BNEs is done
to eliminate any BNE which are not sequentially rational (see Appendix B). If there
are multiple stages, play continues with the first player making another move (firms
choose a second market price) which is then followed by the process described above.
At the end of each market, payoffs are calculated and equilibria are found for each
firm. We only consider two markets, so the game ends after one repetition.
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CHAPTER III
MODEL
This paper will focus on a Bertrand duopoly where price is the only means of signaling
a firm’s type to the consumers. For simplicity, we assume that there are only two
firms, each is active in a two-period markets, and each supply one product per period.
We also assume that the second product is released after the first with enough time
for consumers to observe the quality of the first good.1
We will assume the firm types are independently drawn from a common
distribution, which is accurately reflected in consumer beliefs, which produces a high
quality type with probability α, and a low quality type with probability 1 − α in
both markets. For simplicity, we will refer to these types as H-type and L-type.
We will also use a subscript t = 1, 2 to denote the market. The consumer’s beliefs
for the first market are µH1 = α and µ
L
1 = 1 − α for a good being of high and
low quality, respectively. A firm’s type is private information, meaning that only
the firm knows its type. Therefore, a single firm’s type is not known by either
the competing firm or the consumers. Each player in the game has the following
type space: {Hx1 , Hx2 }, {Hx1 , Lx2}, {Lx1 , Lx2}, {Lx1 , Hx2 } where the superscript x = A,B
1The introduction of the second good may come before consumers can observe the quality of the
first good. This is reasonable for durable goods, which take more time to reveal their quality. This
scenario will not be discussed.
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denotes the firm. The type space is simply the four possible quality combinations
that a firm can have over the two periods. One of these four type profiles is assigned
to each firm by probability, which decides their qualities in each market as it begins.
For the basic model2, we make some simplifying assumptions about the sig-
naling game with price being the only way firms can signal their product’s quality to
consumers. First, we assume there are no other frictions in the market, so only price
is considered by the consumers when buying a good. All consumers in the market
buy a good, either from of H or L quality, with probability one. We will assume
that firms of the same type have identical marginal costs (see Appendix B) for both
markets such that cH = cH1 = c
H
2 and c
L = cL1 = c
L
2 . It is also assumed that con-
sumers have a constant valuation across all markets for each type of good. Therefore
V H = V H1 = V
H
2 and V
L = V L1 = V
L
2 . The unit costs and consumer valuations are
related in the following ways:
cH > cL ≥ 0
V H > V L
V L > cL
V H > cH
These assumptions on costs and valuations are in line with those used by Janssen
and Roy. The prices that can be charged by each firm are determined using the
inequalities above. It is assumed that for any market t = 1, 2 and for any firm of type
2For reference, a variable list of all variables included in the paper is included in Appendix A.
18
τ ∈ {L,H}, the price is set:
pτt ∈ [0, V H ].
This should be intuitive, given that a firm charging above the highest consumer
valuation will not be able to sell any product to consumers.
High quality firms will charge a common deterministic price pH ∈ [cH , V H ].
A proof of this claim is contained in Appendix C. The low quality firm’s profit, as
found by Janssen and Roy [10], is
piL∗ = α(p¯L − cL) = α(pH − (V H − V L)− cL) (3.1)
A low quality firm will set prices within a price support pL ∈ [pL, p¯L] where, in
accordance with the assumptions of Janssen and Roy [10],
p¯L = pH − (V H − V L) (3.2)
and
pL = piL∗ + cL =⇒ pL = α(pH − (V H − V L)) + cL(1− α). (3.3)
Janssen and Roy noted that if V H−pH = V L− p¯L, consumers are indifferent between
buying a low quality product at its highest price p¯L and a high quality product at its
price pH to obtain (3.2). The low quality firm sets p¯L in (3.2) so that the difference in
pH and p¯L is equal to the difference in consumer valuations for the different types of
products. Therefore, consumers will be willing to pay a price p¯L that is exactly this
difference below pH because they are indifferent about which type of product they
receive. The lower end of the low quality price support, pL, as found in (3.3) is the
lowest possible price that would lead to non-negative profits.
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The sequencing of the game is as follows: The game begins when the quality
of each firm, and therefore the product, is determined by the given probability for
both markets. Next, after learning of their quality, each firm will choose their first
market price px1 to be charged. After consumers observe p
x
1 from each firm, they decide
how much to buy of the first product and from which firm. The final profits for each
firm are then calculated, and the first period ends. To begin the second period, the
consumer beliefs about the quality of each firm, and therefore the product quality, in
the second market is adjusted via the correlation coefficient ρ. These adjustments are
done based on each firm’s quality as revealed in the first period. Meanwhile, firms
also update their beliefs for the second market. This update is done the same for
firms and consumers alike, so consumer beliefs of a firm being high quality match
that of the firms. Now, after learning of their quality, each firm chooses a price px2
to be charged in the second market. Finally, consumers observe px2 from each firm,
form their expectations, and decide how much to buy and from which firm. Profits
are then computed for each firm and the second period ends.
The payoff for each firm is its expected per-unit profit. Throughout the paper
we make assumptions modeled after those of Janssen and Roy [10], but with slight
modifications. We assume that the expected profit for a high quality firm is
E(piHt∗) =
µHt
2
(pH − cH)
while the expected profit for any low quality firm is assumed to be
E(piLt∗) = µHt (p
L − cL)
20
where µτt represents the firm’s priori beliefs about the distribution of firm types at the
beginning of the tth market. The derivation of these expected profits is explained in
more detail in the next section. Consumer payoffs do not directly play a role because
this game focuses on the firm’s ability to signal its type to the consumer. However,
they do factor into the decision made on which price to pay.
Because we are considering two markets, we must take into account changes
in consumer beliefs after the first good is purchased. It should be noted that the
probabilities used above will be altered slightly in the second market when the quality
of the first good is observed. Once the previous product’s quality is able to be
observed, the prior beliefs are then changed to posterior beliefs via the correlation
coefficient. The correlation coefficient ρ relates the qualities of the products from
each market.
The following changes in beliefs are taken from Pires and Catala˜o-Lopes. In
the second market µH1 = α is replaced by µ
H
2 = α + ρ(1− α) if the first product was
observed to be high quality. One can think of these beliefs as consumers believing
they underestimated the portion of high quality firms after seeing a high quality good
in the first market. If the first product was observed as low quality, µH1 = α is replaced
by µH2 = α−ρα. This stems from the idea that consumers feel they overestimated the
probability that a firm was high quality in the first market. These changes are in line
with the expectation that seeing a high quality good in the previous market should
lead to an increase in a consumer’s belief that firms are high quality in the second
market, while observing a low quality good will have the opposite effect. Hence, firms
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who were shown to be high quality in the first market benefit from the separating
equilibrium while low quality firms suffer. Firms also update their beliefs in this way,
which changes the expected profits in the second market. These adjustments lend
credence to the idea that spillover effects can occur in periods that follow a previous
market that ends in a separating equilibrium.
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CHAPTER IV
EQUILIBRIA IN A SINGLE MARKET
Before the first stage of the Bayesian game, we must discuss consumer preferences as
well as create the framework for expected payoffs for the firms. It is very important to
remember that a firm’s type is not known, so only the price of the product is observed
by the consumer. The utility preferences (see Appendix B) are key to choosing which
actions the consumers will play in response to observing a product’s price. It should
be noted that we are only interested in the final payoffs for the firms. However, we
must look at how the consumers will purchase a good to find how much each type of
firm will sell and what profits will follow from those decisions.
The utility a consumer gets from an action is composed of two basic inputs -
quality and price. Conditional on the prices of each good being the same, a consumer
will prefer to have a high quality good over a low quality good. Similarly, if two goods
were of the same quality, a consumer will choose to purchase the good at the lowest
price. These preferences allow us to make a few observations about how the signaling
game will be played.
To decide what action each firm should take, each firm will attempt to max-
imize their profit. Given that a firm is unsure of the price charged by other firms, it
can only charge a price that will help to maximize the expected profit. Therefore a
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firm’s expected profit is important in deciding to mimic or not, which is then used in
determining what price to charge. The expected profits depend on consumer beliefs
along with the unit costs and prices used. Per the model outlined above, consumers’
beliefs are µH1 = α and µ
L
1 = 1− α that a firm is of high or low quality, respectively.
A firm of high quality will only sell in the case that the other firm is of
high quality.1 If the other firm is low quality, the lower price will be chosen by all
consumers because they cannot differentiate the two types. Therefore, the low quality
firm is able to undercut the other firm and take all consumers, so the high quality
firm can expect zero profit. If the second firm is of high quality, they will both charge
the same price and will evenly split the profits. Therefore, similarly to Janssen and
Roy, we find that the expected profit for a high quality firm is
E(piH1∗) =
α
2
(pH − cH). (4.1)
A low quality firm has the ability to sell in any market, but will not always
be able to. If the other firm is of high quality as discussed above, the low quality firm
will be able to undercut its competitor and have a per-unit profit of pL − cL. This
gives a low quality firm an expected profit of
E(piL1∗) = α(pL − cL). (4.2)
in accordance to Janssen and Roy’s work. Note that both expected profits are de-
pendent on α, which is the probability that all other firms (in our case, just one) are
1This stems from the assumption of homogeneity in consumer valuations. By assuming consumer
valuations are constant for each type of firm, we don’t allow for consumers to be partial to high
priced goods as opposed to low priced goods.
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of high quality. The ability to sell a good for either type of firm relies on the type of
the other firm.
If both firms are of low quality, neither firm is guaranteed to sell a non-
zero quantity. Due to the mixed strategy of choosing a price (low quality firms will
randomize their choices of pL over the interval [pL, p¯L]), a low quality firm can expect
to be undercut by the other firm and will therefore not expect any profit in this case.
In the case that both firms randomly select to charge the same price, they will split
the profits just as if both were high quality.
Now that preferences and expected profits are set out for consumers and firms
respectively, we can begin analyzing the Bayesian game. The game begins with each
firm’s quality being assigned, via the probability α from the common distribution,
for both markets. We can assign the qualities for each firm for both markets at the
beginning, or assign qualities at the beginning of each market. The type profiles
(quality combinations over the two markets) come from the type space mentioned in
the previous section.
For the separating equilibria, we will only consider those where the low qual-
ity firm uses a mixed strategy of pL ∈ [pL, p¯L] and the high quality firm uses a
deterministic price pH > pL for pH ∈ [cH , V H ].2 Therefore, we consider the following
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
2This is because according to Janssen and Roy, “Bertrand price competition between (symmetric)
firms eliminates the rent for low quality types that is needed to sustain a fully revealing equilibrium.
Therefore, full revelation necessarily involves randomization over prices (price dispersion).”
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Proposition. With price supports as action spaces for each type of firm, the deter-
ministic high quality price, pH , and low quality price, pL ∈ [pL, p¯L], selected via mixed
strategy constitutes a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE).
Refer to [10] for a proof of this proposition. Hence we will only need to con-
sider fully revealing Bayesian equilibria which involve the high quality firms charging
a strictly higher price than the low quality firms that may lead to separating equi-
libria. The high quality price will be deterministic, meaning that any high quality
firms will charge a common price pH in equilibrium. The low quality price is chosen
via randomization over the price support [pL, p¯L] because no pure strategy (choosing
the same, specific price independent of the other firm’s price) will be sustainable.
Hence, the low quality firms will randomize their prices to give themselves the best
opportunity to earn a positive profit in equilibrium.
Given that we are only looking at two firms, we have three possibilities for
the type distribution within the market that are described below.
4.1 Both Firms are of High Quality
In the case where both firms are of high quality, a common deterministic price pH
leads to an even share of sales in the market. Because of this, each receives a profit
of exactly
piH1∗ =
pH − cH
2
> 0. (4.3)
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4.2 Both Firms are of Low Quality
In the scenario where both firms are of low quality, a firm will sell at price p ∈ [pL, p¯L]
as long as the other firm does not offer a lower price. The expected profit at price
p is then
(
1 − (1 − α)(1 − F (p)))[p − cL] where F (p) is a cumulative probability
distribution function that gives the probability of selling at any price pL < pˆ < p
where both firms are low quality.3 In the case where both firms are of low quality we
have the following two sub-cases.
4.2.1 Firms Select Different Prices
Suppose, without loss of generality, that for the two firms we have pA < pB, where pA
and pB correspond to the prices set by the first and second firms respectively. Then
firm A will undercut firm B and be able to gain all of the sales because consumers will
choose the lower price given that they are unaware of their types. The equilibrium
profits for each firm are then
piA1∗ = pA − cL ≥ 0 and piB1∗ = 0. (4.4)
4.2.2 Both Firms Select the Same Price pL ∈ [pL, p¯L]
In this case, both firms will sell to the consumers similarly to the case for high quality
firms. As in the scenario for two high quality firms, they will both split the profits
evenly. This yields an equilibrium profit of
piL1∗ =
pL − cL
2
≥ 0 (4.5)
3To see how F (p) was derived, see Appendix C.
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for both firms. In this case α = 0, so actual profits can exceed the expected profit
as given by (4.2). It should be noted, however, that this case will happen with a
probability that is essentially zero given the randomization of prices. This is because
there are large number of discrete prices that can be chosen by each low quality firm
within the price support [pL, p¯L]. Even with a price support of length 1, there are
100 different prices to choose from. Randomly having each firm pick the same price
within a $1 range is only expected to occur with probability .012 = .0001. Therefore,
we can expect this to occur rarely, if at all, within any price support which is likely
to be more than $1 wide.
4.3 Firms Differ in Quality
When the two firms are of opposite qualities, a firm’s ability to signal it is high quality
(or to fool the consumer into thinking it is high quality) is especially important. As
stated previously, a high quality firm relies on being able to separate from low quality
firms in order to sell its products. If they cannot signal their true quality to consumers,
all products will be seen as homogeneous in quality and the low quality good will be
chosen because of its lower price.
It should be noted that a low quality firm charges its highest possible price,
p¯L in the scenario where it is the only low quality firm in the market. When there are
multiple low quality firms, the lowest price of all will take the entire market share and
all others will not be able to sell. As the number of firms increases, the low quality
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price will approach the low quality marginal cost.4 Because the low quality firm is
the lone low quality firm in the market, it will earn a positive profit of
piL1∗ = p¯L − cL
In this case, the high quality firm earns zero profit.
For either type of firm to mimic each other, there must be some economic
incentive. A low quality firm will imitate a high quality firm by setting a high quality
price if its profits increase above non-imitation levels. Likewise, the high quality firm
will want to sell some quantity at a low quality price that gives a positive profit.
If a low quality firm is able to successfully mimic the high quality firm, it can
sell at the deterministic price pH with a profit of piL =
1
2
(pH − cL). The high quality
firm would earn a profit of piH =
1
2
(pH − cH).
Consider the case where a low quality firm wishes to mimic a high quality
firm by charging price pH > p¯L. This deviation is not gainful if, and only if,
α
2
(pH − cL) ≤ α(p¯L − cL) = E(piL∗)
=⇒ pH ≥ 2(V H − V L) + cL. (4.6)
Another possibility is that a high quality firm will attempt to mimic a low
quality firm and undercut all other firms. If the second firm was of low quality and
was unable to act as high quality, this would lead to a positive profit which would
4If N is the number of low quality firms, then according to Janssen and Roy pL = αN−1p¯L +
cL(1− αN−1). Then N →∞ =⇒ pL → cL because α < 1.
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make the firm better off. However, the high quality firm must be careful to charge a
price which is still above its costs while being within the low quality price support.
We consider the high quality firm wishing to mimic the low quality firm by
choosing a price pˆ ∈ [pL, p¯L]. For this to be gainful, the expected profits for the firm
at price pˆ must be higher than at price pH . Let q(p) be the quantity sold at price p
in equilibrium.5 Then, the expected net profit for the high quality firm, as was found
in [10], is
(pˆ− cH)q(pˆ) = (pˆ− cL)q(pˆ)− (cH − cL)q(pˆ)
= piL∗net − (cH − cL)q(pˆ)
≤ piL∗net − (cH − cL)q(p¯L)
= α(p¯L − cH).
Hence, a high quality firm’s best mimicking strategy would be to charge pH = p¯L.
This deviation to a price of p¯L is not gainful if, and only if, the profit from deviating
is smaller than the expected profit from the price pH . This implies that pH must be
such that
α(p¯L − cH) ≤ α
2
(pH − cH) = piH∗
=⇒ pH ≤ 2(V H − V L) + cH (4.7)
for the deviation to price p¯L from price pH to not be gainful for the high quality firm.
5Through correspondence with Dr. Santanu Roy, it was explained that α is identical to q(p¯L) in
the case where only two firms exist. Here, α can be thought of as equaling the expected quantity at
price p¯L. This gives us the final result in the inequality below.
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Using the results from (4.6) and (4.7), we can guarantee that neither type of
firm will attempt to mimic another type if the high quality firm sets a price pH such
that
2(V H − V L) + cL ≤ pH ≤ 2(V H − V L) + cH (4.8)
which can also be written as
V H − V L
pH − cL ≤
1
2
≤ V
H − V L
pH − cH .
Hence if a high quality firm chooses its price in such a way that satisfies
(4.8), neither type of firm will wish to mimic each other and the high quality firm
has the ability to signal its type to consumers. Equilibrium beliefs then imply that
any equilibria will not involve deviation by the firms in an attempt to deceive the
consumers into believing they are of a different quality.
In addition to the above analysis, we will need to discuss the out-of-equilibrium
beliefs. The out-of-equilibrium beliefs are used when a consumer observes a price that
is not what is expected. This means that they observe a price p which is neither equal
to pH nor in the low quality price support [pL, p¯L].
If p 6= pH , p /∈ [pL, p¯L], then consumers will believe the firm is of low quality
with probability one. This is because the price observed is not conducive for the
high quality firm, due to the price not matching the deterministic price pH . Hence,
the firm charging this price is assumed to be for a low quality firm with reasonable
certainty.
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Given that a high quality firm will charge a common deterministic price of
pH , any price outside of the low quality price support will be the result of attempted
mimicry by the low quality firm. Therefore, consumers will choose not to purchase a
good at a price p ∈ (p¯L, pH) and will be better off by purchasing from another firm.
Firms will not want to deviate to such prices because of this. Also, if p > pH the firm
will not be able to sell any product. All consumers will strictly prefer to purchase
from other firms even if they are certain the product is of high quality. Similarly,
choosing p < pL will not be beneficial to the firm by (4.7).
If these pricing strategies hold as shown in Janssen and Roy, we will have a
separating equilibrium if, and only if, pH satisfies
θ0 ≡ max{cH , 2(V H − V L) + cL} ≤ pH ≤ min{2(V H − V L) + cH , V H} ≡ θ1. (4.9)
For this separating equilibrium to exist, it is a necessary and sufficient condition6 to
require only that
V L − cL
V H − cL ≥
1
2
.
This inequality and (4.9) come directly from the work of [10]. A summary of this
section is done in the following lemma, similarly to Lemma 1 of Janssen and Roy.
Lemma. A symmetric fully revealing equilibrium exists in which the high quality firm
charges pH and all consumers purchase one good if, and only if,
V L − cL
V H − cL ≥
1
2
. (4.10)
6For a derivation of this condition, refer to Appendix C.
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The set of possible prices for the high quality firm is [θ0, θ1]. In this equilibrium, the
low quality firm will randomize over the interval [pL, p¯L], p¯L < pH . The equilibrium
expected unit-profits of each firm are defined as in (4.1) and (4.2).
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CHAPTER V
EQUILIBRIA IN A SECOND MARKET
In this section, we will discuss the portion of the game which takes place in a second
market after consumers are able to observe the first products’ qualities and following
a separating equilibrium in the first market. In other words, the high quality firm
was able to separate from the low quality firm through setting pH in such a way that
it deterred any mimicking by the other firm. The results and analysis of the second
market are our contributions to price signaling research concerning multiple markets.
The analysis of this scenario begins with adjusting the beliefs used by the
consumers when trying to decide the probability that the new product is of high
quality. At the beginning of the second market, the consumer and both firms have
learned the qualities of both goods in the first market. For consumers, the beliefs
that a second product is of high quality is either µH2 = α+ ρ(1− α) or µH2 = α− ρα
according to the description of µH2 in Chapter 3. Firms use these same probabilities to
compute their expected profits, which are then used in determining their strategies.
The adjustment of beliefs at the beginning of the second market causes a
change in some variables that affect the payoff structure and decisions of the firms.
Per one of our initial assumptions, the marginal costs and consumer valuations (cτ
and V τ ) remain the same in the second market. The upper boundary of the low
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quality price support, p¯L will also remain the same amount below pH . The lower
end of the low quality price support, pL, will change along with of the adjustment
in beliefs. In the second market, the magnitude of this change depends on both the
initial belief α as well as the correlation coefficient ρ. The specific adjustments of pL
will be discussed within each scenario below.
In an attempt to find equilibria conditions in a second market which follows a
separating equilibrium in the first market, there are two scenarios of interest. In the
first scenario, neither firm changes its type. Therefore, a firm which was of low quality
in the first market will remain low quality and a high quality firm will remain of high
quality in the second market. The second scenario involves both firms switching
types, so a low quality firm will become high quality in the second market and vice
versa.1 We will look at these cases for the rest of the chapter.
5.1 Firms Remain the Same Types
While both firms remain the same type as in the first market, neither is aware that the
other firm has remained the same quality. As expressed earlier, the high quality firm
believes that the low quality firm is of high quality with probability µH2 (L1) = α−ρα.
The low quality firm believes that the high quality firm is high quality with probability
µH2 (H1) = α + ρ(1 − α). It should be noted that these beliefs match those of the
consumers at the beginning of the second stage.
1The scenarios where only one firm changes its type are of little interest, given that they would
be similar to the single market cases where both firms are of the same type.
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These beliefs are the adjusted probabilities using the correlation coefficient
ρ. Using the correlation coefficient allows for a spillover effect to be identified if it
exists. The expected profits for the second market are
E(piH2∗) =
α− ρα
2
(pH − cH) (5.1)
and
E(piL2∗) = [α + ρ(1− α)](p¯L − cL) (5.2)
for the high and low quality firms respectively. The beliefs are mixed compared to
the first market due to the expected profits depending on the probability the other
firm is of high quality. This relates to the firms updating their beliefs, along with
consumers, about the probability that the other firm is high quality. For example,
the high quality firm in the second market was of high quality in the first market.
Therefore, the other firm was of low quality in the previous market and the belief
µH2 (H1) = α − ρα is used when calculating the expected profit for the high quality
firm. A similar analysis provides us with the probability used for the low quality
firm’s expected profit.
While many of the results remain constant, the lower end of the price support
for low quality firms pL will change. Let pL
S
be the lower bound with the firm types
remain the same in the second market. Given the new beliefs and substituting them
into (3.3), we find that
pL
S
= p¯L(α− ρα + ρ) + cL(1− (α− ρα + ρ))
= p¯L(α− ρα + ρ) + cL(1− α + ρα− ρ). (5.3)
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Therefore, the lower bound will be more heavily weighted toward p¯L, and will cause
an increase in pL
S
. Hence, the price support for the low quality firm actually shrinks
in size. With the low quality price support in place, we can continue toward finding
a revealing equilibrium.
The analysis of mimicking is similar to that of the single market. The low
quality firm only wishes to mimic the high quality firm if the deviation to a price pH
is profitable over charging p¯L. This deviation is not profitable if, and only if,
[α− ρ(1− α)](p¯L − cL) ≥ α− ρα
2
(pH − cL)
=⇒ pH ≥ 2βS(V H − V L) + cL, (5.4)
where βS =
(
α− αρ+ ρ
α− αρ+ 2ρ
)
. Therefore if pH satisfies the above inequality, a low
quality firm will choose not to mimic in the second market.
It should be noted that a restriction on the coefficient βS must be positive
for the inequality to not be reversed. This holds if either the numerator is positive,
or if the denominator is negative. Setting the numerator greater than zero yields
α− αρ+ ρ > 0
=⇒ ρ > α
α− 1
which is always satisfied, given that ρ ∈ [0, 1] and α ∈ (0, 1). Therefore the inequality
above holds regardless of the value of ρ. Hence, we do not need to place any restric-
tions on product quality correlation or consumer beliefs for a separating equilibrium
in this market.
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The high quality firm will decide whether or not to mimic in a similar way.
The deviation to a price p¯L from a price pH is not beneficial if, and only if,
[α− ρ(1− α)](p¯L − cH) ≤ α− ρα
2
(pH − cH)
=⇒ pH ≤ 2βS(V H − V L) + cH . (5.5)
Note inequality (5.5) holds for any values of α and ρ.
Assuming the out of equilibrium beliefs are the same as in the first market, we
can create an interval of high quality prices that give the opportunity for separation
in the second market. Combining inequalities (5.4) and (5.5) gives a result similar
to that of the single market defined in the following way. A separating equilibrium
exists in a second market where firms do not change types if, and only if, pH satisfies
θ0,S = max{cH , 2βS(V H − V L) + cL}
≤ pH
≤ min{2βS(V H − V L) + cH , V H} = θ1,S. (5.6)
For this separating equilibrium to exist, it is a necessary and sufficient condition to
require only that
2βS − 1
2βS
≤ V
L − cL
V H − cL .
It should be noted that since 0 ≤ βS < 1 for any possible ρ, the price support
for a fully revealing pH will contain lower prices than in the single market case.
Therefore, the high quality firm will be able to separate from the low quality firm
with a lower price than previously. This is indicative of spillover effects being present
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in the second market when neither firm switches its type. These spillover effects are
present regardless of the correlation between firm types in different markets, as long
as the first market resulted in a revealing equilibrium. The results from this scenario
are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma. A symmetric fully revealing equilibrium for the second market where firm
types are held constant exists in which the high quality firm charges pH and all con-
sumers purchase one good if, and only if,
2βS − 1
2βS
≤ V
L − cL
V H − cL (5.7)
The set of possible prices for the high quality firm is [θ0,S, θ1,S]. There is no additional
restriction on the correlation coefficient ρ. In this equilibrium, the low quality firm will
randomize over the interval [pL
S
, p¯L], p¯L < pH . The equilibrium expected unit-profits
of each firm are defined as in (5.1) and (5.2).
5.2 Firms Change Types
This indicates a firm that was high quality in the first market is now low quality and
vice versa. Again we assume that neither firm is aware of the changes to the other
firm’s type, but only of its own change. Each firm updates their beliefs as in the
previous case, yielding the expected profits
E(piH2∗) =
α + ρ(1− α)
2
(pH − cH) (5.8)
and
E(piL2∗) = [α− ρα](p¯L − cL) (5.9)
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for the high and low quality firms respectively. Note that the probabilities associated
with each expected profits are reversed from the previous case.
As with the previous case, the lower bound of the low quality price support
will change. Let pL
C
be the lower bound with the firms change types in the second
market. After using the new beliefs in (3.3), it follows that
pL
C
= p¯L(α− ρα) + cL(1− (α− ρα))
= p¯L(α− ρα) + cL(1− α + ρα). (5.10)
Therefore the lower bound, pL
C
, will be more heavily weighted toward the marginal
cost cL, and will decrease. Hence, the price support for the low quality firm actually
expands to include prices below the original pL. With the low quality price support
in place, we can once again continue toward finding a revealing equilibrium.
For a low quality firm to deviate to a price pH , it must be more profitable
than charging p¯L. Therefore, the low quality firm will not deviate if pH is chosen in
a way that
[α− ρα](p¯L − cL) ≥ α + ρ(1− α)
2
(pH − cL)
=⇒ pH ≥ 2βC(V H − V L) + cL, (5.11)
where βC =
(
α− ρα
α− ρα− ρ
)
, is satisfied. The direction of the inequality is dependent
on the requirement we place on ρ. If the correct restriction is not chosen, the direction
of inequality (5.11) will be reversed. This will be discussed after we look at the
mimicking strategy of the high quality firm.
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The high quality firm will deviate to a price p¯L if, and only if, pH satisfies
[α− ρα](p¯L − cH) ≤ α + ρ(1− α)
2
(pH − cH)
=⇒ pH ≤ 2βC(V H − V L) + cH . (5.12)
Once again, the direction of inequality (5.12) depends on the value of ρ.
To ensure that inequalities (5.11) and (5.12) do not change direction, we place
a restriction on ρ that guarantees
2βC(V
H − V L) + cL ≤ pH ≤ 2βC(V H − V L) + cH . (5.13)
Therefore, we need to restrict ρ such that
0 <
α− ρα
α− ρα− ρ
=⇒ ρ < α
1 + α
(5.14)
is satisfied. Note that ρ is positive and bounded above by
1
2
regardless of α. Hence,
this restriction on ρ is consistent with the definition of ρ being between 0 and 1.
With ρ being less than
1
2
, consumers will view firms in the second market as being
the opposite type of the first market more times than not; the lower correlation
coefficient indicates that firms are more likely to change types between markets.
With the restriction on ρ above, we can once again find an interval for pH
where we can guarantee the existance of a separating equilibrium for the second
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market. A separating equilibrium exists if ρ <
α
1 + α
, and pH satisfies
θ0,C = max{cH , 2βC(V H − V L) + cL}
≤ pH
≤ min{2βC(V H − V L) + cH , V H} = θ1,C . (5.15)
From this inequality, it is a necessary and sufficient condition to require only that
2βC − 1
2βC
≤ V
L − cL
V H − cL
for the separating equilibrium to exist in the second market. Keeping in mind the
restriction on ρ and noting that βC ≥ 1 allows us to make some observations about
the high quality price support.
Given that βC ≥ 1, it should be clear that the lower and upper bounds of
the high quality price support should increase in the second market. This is reflec-
tive of the additional cost of signaling brought on by the low correlation coefficient.
Consumers are unable to use information from the first market on which to base
their buying preferences. Firms are unable to use any of the results from the first
market to benefit themselves and it becomes harder for consumers to believe a firm
is high quality. Therefore, in the second market, the high quality firm necessarily has
to charge a higher price pH than in the first market to reveal its type. We see no
indication that spillover effects are present in the second market when firms change
types.
The results from this scenario are similar to that of the previous market. The
final inequality that is sufficient in guaranteeing a separating equilibrium is nearly the
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same, but we must also set a requirement on ρ when the firms change types. These
results are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma. A symmetric fully revealing equilibrium for the second market where firms
change types exists in which the high quality firm charges pH and all consumers pur-
chase one good if, and only if,
ρ <
α
1 + α
AND
2βC − 1
2βC
≤ V
L − cL
VH − cL (5.16)
The set of possible prices for the high quality firm is [θ0,C , θ1,C ]. In this equilibrium, the
low quality firm will randomize over the interval [pL
C
, p¯L], p¯L < pH . The equilibrium
expected unit-profits of each firm are defined as in (5.8) and (5.9).
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CHAPTER VI
NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
Following the theoretical derivation of prices which constitute a separating equilib-
rium, we will use numerical examples to further explain and demonstrate the above
results. By selecting multiple levels of α and ρ and choosing values of cH , cL, V H ,
and V L, we hope to give realistic examples of how the above research could apply
to real life markets. We will consider the following scenarios: when firm costs and
consumer valuations are nearly identical and when firms have large cost and valuation
differences.
To provide the following numerical examples, a MATLAB code1 was written
and used. The levels of α and ρ were varied, using ρ ∈ {0.1, 0.4, 0.7, 1} and α ∈
{0.1, 0.25, 0.4, 0.55, 0.7, 0.85, 1}. To calculate expected profits and the price supports,
a price for pH is needed to be selected. It doesn’t matter which value it takes, as
long as it lies within the possible separating price support [θ0, θ1] prescribed in the
market as in (4.9), (5.6) and (5.15) . For simplicity, the price pH was selected as the
midpoint of this range. In the case that the chosen pH ≤ p¯L, pH was increased until
pH > p¯L to avoid a possible pooling equilibrium scenario.
1The MATLAB code used has been provided in Appendix D
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6.1 Similar Costs and Valuations
Consider an industry where two firms (one of each quality) produce two similar prod-
ucts (one of each quality) in each of two markets. Additionally we assume that
consumers value the low and high quality goods similarly, with the high quality good
being valued slightly higher than the low quality good for each market. Also assume
that the high quality firm has a slightly higher marginal cost in each market.
For context suppose that Apple plays the role of the high quality firm in
the first market, while Microsoft is the low quality firm. Think of the two goods
as two of the original MP3 players that were released in the early 2000’s - Apple’s
iPod versus the Microsoft Zune. Upon their initial release, consumers were unaware
of their qualities given that MP3 players were in their infancy. Both companies
had made their mark in the computer industry, but were new to the MP3 market.
Therefore, being able to convince consumers they had a high quality product would
prove beneficial for either firm.
To differentiate its product and show that it is of higher quality, the price
of the iPod will necessarily need to be high enough to keep Microsoft from imitating
it. This is handled in the first market, which can be thought of as the beginning of
the MP3 player battle that occured in the early 2000’s. We assume without loss of
generality that Apple is the high quality firm in the first market. It is assumed that
the marginal costs were comparable to each other, with Apple’s being slightly higher.
Additionally, we can assume that consumers would value the two products similarly
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because of how new the MP3 industry was at the time, but favor the iPod over the
Zune.
For this example, we chose to use cH = 6, V H = 20, cL = 5, and V L = 19
for Apple and Microsoft respectively. Note that these choices for costs and consumer
valuations satisfy inequality (4.10). Therefore, we will always have a separating
equilibrium in the first market.
To demonstrate a specific example, we will choose α = 0.4 and ρ = 0.1 and
explain the results. By choosing a high quality price of $7.50, we find the set of prices
that can be sustained as the high quality price pH in any separating equilibrium is the
interval from $7.00 to $8.00. The price supports for the first market of our specific
example are found in Figure 6.1. In such an equilibrium, the low quality firms follow
a mixed strategy with support [$5.60, $6.50]. The equilibrium per-unit profits of the
high and low quality firms are $0.30 and $0.60, respectively.
Figure 6.1: Similar Costs and Valuations - Price supports in 1st market.
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In the second market, with the above parameters, we must look at the cases
where both firms maintain their qualities and where both change their quality. When
firms do not change qualities, a high quality price pH exists that produces a fully
revealing equilibrium. We use pH = $7.14 for the rest of the calculations. The set of
prices that can be sustained as the high quality price pH in any such equilibrium is
the interval from $6.64 to $7.64. In such an equilibrium, the low quality firms follow
a mixed strategy with support [$5.53, $6.14]. These price supports (along with those
for other values of ρ and α) can be seen in Figure 6.2. The equilibrium per-unit
profits of the high and low quality firms are $0.21 and $0.53, respectively.
When firms change their qualities, our choices of ρ = 0.1 and α = 0.4 satisfy
(5.16). Therefore we will have a separating equilibrium in the second market. How-
ever, ρ = 0.4 only provided separation for α close to 1. Any value of ρ ≥ 0.5 will not
allow for separation by (5.16). We use a high quality price of $8.27, as determined
through calculations of the high quality price support. The set of prices that can be
sustained as the high quality price pH in any such equilibrium is the interval from
$7.77 to $8.77. In such an equilibrium, the low quality firms follow a mixed strategy
with support [$6.04, $7.27]. The price supports for both qualities are shown in Figure
6.3. The equilibrium per-unit profits of the high and low quality firms are $0.41 and
$1.04, respectively.
In general, we can determine if a separating equilibrium can be achieved
based on our parameter choices, as well as how the price supports will change. The
parameters chosen are arbitrary, but are meant to demonstrate how the analysis done
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(a) Low correlation: ρ = 0.1 (b) Medium correlation: ρ = 0.4
(c) High correlation: ρ = 0.7
Figure 6.2: Similar Costs and Valuations - Price supports in 2nd market where firms
do not change quality. As ρ→ 1, the high quality price support shifts toward cH . As
α→ 1, the low quality price support shrinks toward p¯L.
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Figure 6.3: Similar Costs and Valuations - Price supports in 2nd market where firms
change types, with ρ = 0.1. As α → 1, we see the high quality price support shifts
toward cH and the low quality price support shrinks. Both price supports are now at
higher levels than in the first market.
in Chapters 4 and 5 can be applied. An overall analysis is provided below for the
scenario when the two firms have similar costs and consumer valuations. The results
are then related back to the specific scenario posed at the beginning of the case.
1. When firms do not change their quality in the second market, all values of ρ and
α allow for a separating equilibrium. The high quality price support is larger
than in the first market. Additionally as ρ → 1, we see the high quality price
support shift toward the marginal cost cH . As α → 1, the high quality price
support slightly increases while the low quality price support shrinks in size.
The lower bound pL approaches the upper bound p¯L, giving the low quality firm
fewer choices for its product’s price. These results can be seen in Figure 6.2.
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2. When both firms change their qualities, we only see a separating equilibrium
for ρ = 0.1 and α ≥ 0.25. This is as expected, given that ρ must satisfy the
result from (5.16). These are the only combinations of ρ and α which give a
separating equilibrium in the second market where both firms have changed
qualities (for the chosen parameters). As α→ 1, the high quality price support
shifts downward, and the low quality price support shrinks. Additionally, we
should note that both price supports are higher than in the first market, because
they are unable to take advantage of spillover effects due to changing qualities.
These results are shown in Figure 6.3.
Therefore in the case of Apple and Microsoft, Apple can take advantage of
a spillover effect in the second market (the release of the iPod 2nd generation) and
be able to charge a lower price while maintaining its signaling power. Not changing
types would allow Apple to take advantage of low levels of α and ρ and separate again
in the second market. If the firms change types and α and ρ are too high, then there
won’t be a second separating equilibrium.
In actuality, the first iPod debuted at $399.99, while the Zune started at
$249.99. The higher price charged by Apple likely was a signal to demonstrate their
true quality and it seemed to have worked. Also, the initial prices of each basic iPod
release before the video iPod or iPod Touch indicate that Apple was able to take
advantage of spillover effects. The prices began to fall with each basic model, which
is in line with our model’s expectations and prior research.
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6.2 High Differences in Costs and Valuations
Now we consider an industry with considerable cost and valuation differences between
a high quality and low quality firm. Again, we have two firms (one of each quality)
which produce two products (one of by each firm) in each of two markets. For
simplicity, we assume the goods being produced are common items that vary in both
cost and valuation: jewelry.
Larger jewelry chains like Kay Jewelers or Jared claim to produce high end
diamonds with real silver or gold settings. With all the special collections of diamonds
and settings, Jared offers what seem to be high quality variations on basic jewelry.
Smaller jewelers may offer alternatives made of cubic zirconia or low quality metals,
without the ‘premium’ styles or collections. Therefore, the jewelry industry could
certainly be analyzed within this framework.
Just as in the previous case, we assume that the costs for Jared, our high
quality firm, are much higher than the small business jeweler, our low quality firm.
Also, assume that consumers would much rather purchase jewelry from Jared than
the small jeweler - consumer valuation for the high quality jewelry is much higher
than for the low quality jewelry.
With this in mind, we used the parameters cH = 20, V H = 40, cL = 10, and
V L = 30 for Jared and its small business competitor respectively. These parameters
satisfy inequality (4.10), which implies that a separating equilibrium will occur in the
first market regardless of the value of α.
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To demonstrate a specific example, we will choose specific levels of α = 0.7
and ρ = 0.1 and explain the results once again. Choosing pH to be the midpoint of
the high quality price support gives us pH = $35.00. The set of prices that can be
sustained as the high quality price pH in any such equilibrium is the interval from
$30.00 to $40.00. In such an equilibrium, the low quality firms follow a mixed strategy
with support [$20.50, $25.00]. The price supports from our example can be seen in
Figure 6.4. The equilibrium per-unit profits of the high and low quality firms are
$5.25 and $10.50, respectively.
Figure 6.4: High Cost and Valuation Differences - Price supports in 1st market.
In the second market involving the chosen parameters, we must once again
look at the two scenarios described previously. When firms do not change their
qualities, we use the high quality price pH = $32.59. The set of prices that can
be sustained as the high quality price pH in any such equilibrium is the interval
from $27.59 to $37.59. In such an equilibrium, the low quality firms follow a mixed
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strategy with support [$19.19, $22.59]. These price supports are shown in Figure 6.5.
The equilibrium per-unit profits of the high and low quality firms are $3.97 and $9.19,
respectively.
When firms change their qualities, our choices of ρ = 0.1 and α = 0.7 satisfy
(5.16). Just as above, we are able to achieve a separating equilibrium. We use a
price pH = 36.89 which lies at the middle of the high quality price support which
was calculated as the interval from $33.77 to $40.00. In such an equilibrium, the
low quality firms follow a mixed strategy with support [$22.33, $26.89]. These price
supports can be seen in Figure 6.6. The equilibrium per-unit profits of the high and
low quality firms are $5.32 and $12.33, respectively.
Again, we can analyze the effects different levels of ρ and α will have on the
shifting and size of the price supports. We summarize the findings below, and relate
them back to the example of Jared versus the small jewelry store.
1. When firms do not change their qualities in the second market, we see similar
results as when the firms have similar costs and consumer valuations. All values
of ρ and α provide a separating equilibrium, while also indicating spillover effects
in the second market. The high quality price support is at a lower level than in
the first market equilibrium, and shifts slightly upward as α increases. The low
quality price support also shrinks in size and shifts upward as α→ 1. Therefore,
Jared can charge a lower price in the second market and take advantage of the
first market separation. These results can be seen in Figure 6.5.
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(a) Low correlation: ρ = 0.1 (b) Medium correlation: ρ = 0.4
(c) High correlation: ρ = 0.7
Figure 6.5: High Cost and Valuation Differences - Price supports in 2nd market
where firms do not change quality. As ρ → 1, the high quality price support shifts
downward. As α→ 1, the low quality firm’s price support shrinks and shifts upward.
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Figure 6.6: High Cost and Valuation Differences - Price supports in 2nd market where
firms change types, with ρ = 0.1. As α → 1, we see the high quality price support
grows and shifts toward cH . The low quality price support again shrinks as α → 1.
Both price supports are also at higher levels than in the previous market.
2. When firms change types, ρ must again satisfy (5.14) to achieve a separating
equilibrium. We see that a separating equilibrium occurs for the same values
of α and ρ as when firms change types. There would have to be a very small
probability that a firm was low quality in the previous market to even allow
for them to effectively signal any change to high quality in a second market.
Therefore if Jared produces a low quality product in the second market, while
the small business jeweler has a high quality product, the small business jeweler
will have to charge a higher price to separate than was needed in the first market.
They will have to prove that they have a high end product by charging a higher
price pH than in the first market, as seen in Figure 6.6.
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Given these parameters, Jared can separate in both markets as long as both
firms remain the same quality in both markets. Spillover effects are present, as ex-
pected. Even in the case that firms change quality after the first market, a separating
equilibrium is unlikely to occur. Comparing the real-world prices of these two firms,
we typically see that the prices charged by Jared are much higher. But is it indicative
of their true quality? We’ll leave that to the consumers.
6.3 Numerical Conclusions
There are many more scenarios that can be evaluated with the use of the MATLAB
code provided in Appendix D. These should lead to more numerical results and
situations that would be applicable to many real world markets. We have chosen to
include only a couple of the examples to demonstrate how the code works within the
theoretical model discussed in the previous two chapters. The numerical results agree
with the theoretical predictions included in the report above.
As expected, when firms stay the same type and are able to separate in the
first market, we see the high quality price support shift downward toward the high
quality marginal cost cH . This is indicative of the spillover effects from a separating
equilibrium in the first market. The high quality firm can now separate with a lower
price than in the first market. When the firms change types, the price ranges are
initially higher than those in the first market when ρ is small. If ρ is too large,
we will not have a separating equilibrium. We see the high quality separating price
range expand and shift downward as α increases toward 1. At the same time, the
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low quality range shrinks as pL increases toward p¯L. These findings agree with the
conclusion of the theoretical work done above.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
By combining the ideas and models from previous literature, we have created a model
to analyze pricing decisions within a two-period duopoly framework. By comparing
the expected profit functions for high and low quality firms, we were able to identify
when mimicking was or was not beneficial to each type (quality) of firm. Under certain
assumptions regarding the costs, valuations, and beliefs of the firms and consumers,
we were able to find price supports that would allow the high quality firm to effectively
signal its type to consumers.
In the first market case, we were able to replicate and confirm the findings
of Janssen and Roy [10]. The high quality firm is able to separate from the low
quality firm as long as (4.10) is satisfied. In short, if the difference between consumer
valuation of the low quality good and the low quality marginal cost, V L − cL, is at
least half of this difference for the high quality valuation, V H − cL, then a separating
equilibrium can be achieved in the market. This was as expected, given that Janssen
and Roy’s model was the basis for our research of extending the results to multiple-
period markets by introducing the ideas used by Pires and Catala˜o-Lopes [17].
From there, we created the adapted model to be used in the second market.
We assumed that the first market ended in a separating equilibrium, allowing all
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consumers and both firms to observe the true qualities of each first market product.
Holding costs and consumer valuations constant from the previous market, we up-
dated beliefs and expected profits at the beginning of the second market. In this
market, we accounted for the correlation of the products. If a firm was identified as
high quality in the first market, it receives a ’bump’ in consumer beliefs - they now
believe it is high quality with probability α + ρ(1 − α). If the firm was identified
as low quality, they are penalized and believed to be high quality with probability
α− ρα.
We also accounted for two scenarios for when the firms do or do not switch
their types between markets. The cases where only one firm changes its type produces
two firms of the same quality, with results similar to those at the beginning of Chapter
4. For this reason, we did not include them in our analysis. Using a similar analysis
as in the single market, via the updated expected profits, we found high quality price
supports that would also allow the firm to separate in the second market for each
case. The existence of these price supports is confirmed as long as (5.7) and (5.16) are
satisfied. As in the first market, we can look at the ratio of differences in valuations
and the low quality marginal cost to determine whether separation is feasible. When
firms change types, we also require that the product qualities are not highly correlated
according to the first inequality in (5.16).
In the second market, our price supports are slightly different from those in
the single market case. We observe that the price supports can shift in a second
market following a separating equilibrium in the previous market. In the case where
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firms do not change types, the price support for separating high quality prices is
shifted downward to contain lower prices. This implies that the cost of signaling is
lower in the second market, indicating that spillover effects are present in this case.
When firms switch types, we see an upward shift of the price supports. Hence, the
high quality firm will now have to charge a higher price to compensate for being low
quality in the previous market. To convince consumers the firm is now high quality,
they must pay a higher premium and charge a higher price. This is what causes the
set of viable prices to shift upward, where spillover effects do not help the high quality
firm.
Our findings are somewhat limited given the assumptions we made concerning
number of firms, costs, and valuations. Future research could be done to adapt this
model to multiple subsequent markets, as well as markets involving more than two
firms. In addition, varying costs and consumer valuations across markets would allow
for a more realistic simulation of real businesses.
60
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Franklin Allen. Reputation and product quality. The RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics, pages 311–327, 1984.
[2] Daniel F Spulber. Bertrand competition when rivals’ costs are unknown. The
Journal of Industrial Economics, pages 1–11, 1995.
[3] Maarten Janssen and Eric Rasmusen. Bertrand competition under uncertainty.
The Journal of Industrial Economics, 50(1):11–21, 2002.
[4] Kyle Bagwell and Michael H Riordan. High and declining prices signal product
quality. The American Economic Review, pages 224–239, 1991.
[5] Kyle Bagwell. Pricing to signal product line quality. Journal of Economics &
Management Strategy, 1(1):151–174, 1992.
[6] Helmut Bester and Juri Demuth. Signalling rivalry and quality uncertainty in a
duopoly. Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 15(2):135–154, 2015.
[7] Michael R Baye and Rick Harbaugh. Comparative price signaling by a multi-
product firm. 2013.
[8] Andrei Dubovik and Maarten CW Janssen. Oligopolistic competition in price
and quality. Games and Economic Behavior, 75(1):120–138, 2012.
[9] Andrew F Daughety and Jennifer F Reinganum. Imperfect competition and
quality signalling. The RAND Journal of Economics, 39(1):163–183, 2008.
[10] Maarten CW Janssen and Santanu Roy. Signaling quality through prices in an
oligopoly. Games and Economic Behavior, 68(1):192–207, 2010.
[11] Paul Milgrom and John Roberts. Price and advertising signals of product quality.
The Journal of Political Economy, pages 796–821, 1986.
61
[12] In-Koo Cho and David M Kreps. Signaling games and stable equilibria. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, pages 179–221, 1987.
[13] Laurent Linnemer. Price and advertising as signals of quality when some con-
sumers are informed. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20(7):931–
947, 2002.
[14] Claude Fluet and Paolo G Garella. Advertising and prices as signals of quality
in a regime of price rivalry. International Journal of Industrial Organization,
20(7):907–930, 2002.
[15] Hao Zhao. Raising awareness and signaling quality to uninformed consumers: A
price-advertising model. Marketing Science, 19(4):390–396, 2000.
[16] Makoto Abe. Price and advertising strategy of a national brand against its
private-label clone: A signaling game approach. Journal of Business Research,
33(3):241–250, 1995.
[17] Cesaltina Pacheco Pires and Margarida Catala˜o-Lopes. Signaling advertising by
multiproduct firms. International Journal of Game Theory, 40(2):403–425, 2011.
62
APPENDICES
63
APPENDIX A
VARIABLE LIST
Variable Description
µτt Consumer beliefs at the beginning of the t
th market for a good of type τ ,
µτt ∈ [0, 1]
F (p) Probability distribution of selling a good by charging price p
τ True quality of the firm, τ ∈ {H,L}
α The probability that a firm is of high quality, α ∈ [0, 1].
Taken from consumer beliefs about the distribution of firm qualities.
ρ Degree of correlation between the first and second products, ρ ∈ [0, 1]
cτ Marginal (unit) cost of production for firm of quality τ , cτ ≥ 0
V τ Consumer valuation for 1 unit of good of quality τ , V τ ≥ 0
pτt Market price chosen by firm in market i, p
τ
t ∈ [0, V H ]
piτt Equilibrium profit for firm of type τ in market t
pL Lower bound on the low quality price support.
p¯L Upper bound on the low quality price support.
βC , βS Coefficients from adjustment in beliefs in the second market.
The size of the coefficient determines shifting of equilibrium price supports.
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APPENDIX B
GLOSSARY
Action Set: The group of actions a player can take during the course of the game.
Bayes’ Rule: Used to calculate conditional probabilities. Bayes’ Rule relates cur-
rent probability to a prior probability. It is written as:
Pr(A|B) = Pr(B|A)Pr(A)
Pr(B)
Bayesian Equilibrium: The strategy profiles and beliefs specified for each player
about the types of the other players that maximizes the expected payoff for
each player, given their beliefs about the other players’ types and given the
strategies played by the other players.
Belief System: A belief system is an assignment of probabilities to every node in
the game such that the sum of probabilities in any information set is 1.
Bertrand Oligopoly: A market with a small number of firms which set prices,
which consumers then use to decide how much of a good to purchase.
Consumer Valuations: The highest value given to a product by consumers, which
varies depending on the product’s type. It can be thought of as the highest price
a consumer is willing to pay for a good of a certain quality.
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Deterministic Price: A price which is consistent among all firms, independent of
input costs. Therefore, differing inputs will always lead to firms charging the
same price.
Domination Criterion: No player will choose an action which leads to a worse
payoff. If action A leads to a higher payoff than action B, the player will not
choose action B.
Expected Profit: The profit a firm expects to gain based on the likelihood that it
can sell in the market with another firm of an unknown type.
Hybrid Equilibrium: An equilibrium in which one or both types (qualities) of
player randomizes its strategy. The firm will randomly choose to mimic or not
mimic based on a given probability.
Information Set: A set, for the particular player, which establishes all the possible
moves that could have taken place to that point given what the player has
observed.
Information Spillovers: Extra effects which occur due to results from a previous
stage. These can be thought of as carryover effects, which cause adjustments
in a player’s beliefs in subsequent stages.
Intuitive Criterion: Also known as the Cho Kreps Intuitive Criterion. If the
receiver observes a deviation from the equilibrium, then the receiver should not
believe that the sender is of type B if both of the following are true:
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1. The deviation would result in type B being worse off then if he has stuck
to the equilibrium for any beliefs.
2. There is some type A who is better off by playing the deviation than by
sticking to the equilibrium for some belief other than B.
For a formal definition, refer to the Harvard University lecture notes [?].
Marginal Cost: The additional cost of producing one unit of output. Here, it is
the cost associated with the unit of output sold by a firm.
Mixed Strategy: A probability distribution over the player’s pure strategies. It
is often thought of as randomizing which action is chosen to be played by a
player.
Nash Equilibrium: A stable state reached when no strategy would yield a player
a higher payoff, given all strategies played by the other players. This is also
referred to as a player’s strategy being the best response to all other strategies.
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE): The strategy profile and a belief system
such that the strategies are sequentially rational given the belief system and
the belief system is consistent, wherever possible, given the strategy profile.
Pooling Equilibrium: An equilibrium in which the types of the players are not
revealed through their actions.
Posterior Belief: The belief of a player which has been modified conditional on
an observation.
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Priori: The initial belief of the player, which is independent of any observations.
Pure Strategy: A function that assigns an action in the player’s action set to each
of the player’s information set.
Out-of-Equilibrium Beliefs: These beliefs are tied to equilibria that are not Nash
Equilibria. A player’s out-of-equilibrium beliefs are used to determine if any
equilibria exist where a deviation by all players could increase their payoffs, but
would not occur because of player rationality.
Rent: The additional income brought on by use of a resource, less the costs associ-
ated with bringing the resource into the production process.
Revealing or Separating Equilibrium: An equilibrium in which player types are
revealed; they are able to separate from other players by demonstrating their
true types (qualities) to the players.
Strategy Profile: The set of strategies for all players which specifies all actions
that are taken in a game.
Spillover Effect: The effects in a secondary market that stem from the actions
taken in a previous market. An equilibrium in the first market may loosen the
restrictions on a similar equilibrium in the following market if spillover effects
are present.
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Symmetric Equilibrium: An equilibrium in which all players choose the same
action. In our game, this would occur if both firms choose not to mimic each
other.
Type Space: Set of all possible types, or combinations of them in multi-stage
games, that a player can be during the game.
Utility Preferences: Preferences which rank the utility, essentially the ‘happiness’,
gained by choosing an action. These give a list which gives possible actions in
order of preference.
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APPENDIX C
PROOFS AND MATHEMATICAL DERIVATIONS
Theorem. Suppose that all firms know their own type, but this information is not
observable by the other firms and consumers. Then for any number of profit maxi-
mizing firms, all of whom are of high quality, each firm’s profit maximizing price is
some common deterministic Nash Equilibrium price pH .
Proof. Suppose there are two firms, firm 1 and firm 2, which are both of high quality.
Assume both firms have identical unit costs so that c1 = c2 = c
H . Let q(p) be the
quantity sold at price p. Suppose that firm 1 charges price p1 = p
H ∈ [cH , V H ], the
deterministic Nash equilibrium price, which maximizes its profit pi1 = (p
H−cH)q(pH).
Now assume that firm 2 charges a price p2 6= pH which maximizes its profit pi2 =
(p2 − cH)q(p2). The following cases arise:
1. Suppose firm 2 charges a price p2 < p1 = p
H . In this case, because consumers
cannot differentiate the types of the two firms they will choose to buy for the
lower price. Therefore firm 2 will be able to sell q(p2) units and have a profit of
pi(p2). However, they can still increase their profit by charging a higher price
p2 < p
∗
2 < p1. Hence, they are not maximizing profit and will increase the price
to pH to maximize their profit.
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2. Suppose firm 2 charges a price p1 = p
H < p2. With a lower price, firm 1 is able
to undercut firm 2. Therefore, firm 2 is unable to sell and will therefore receive
a profit equal to 0 (pi2 = 0). To be able to sell any positive quantity, the second
firm will necessarily have to adjust the price downward to pH and match the
first firm’s price. Therefore, p2 will fall from its original value to p
H in order to
make a positive profit.
Given these two cases, a price different from the deterministic equilibrium price pH
will necessarily converge to a common price charged by all firms pH ∈ [cH , V H ]. Hence
if even one firm charges differently from pH which is common for all firms, they will
eventually begin charging pH themselves. Therefore, all high quality firms will charge
a common deterministic equilibrium price of pH .
Derivation of F (p)
Taken from the work done by Janssen and Roy, we can find piL∗ for every price
p ∈ [pL, p¯] if
(
α + (1− α)(1− F (p)))[p− cL] = α(pH − (V H − V L)− cL)
=⇒ F (p) = 1
α− 1
(
α(pH − (V H − V L)− cL)
p− cL − 1
)
which is continuous on [pL, p¯], F (p¯L) = 1, and F (pL) = 0.
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Results for Inequality (4.10)
To find such a pH exists to satisfy (4.10), we require that the below inequality
θ0 ≡ max{cH , 2(V H − V L) + cL} ≤ pH ≤ min{2(V H − V L) + cH , V H} ≡ θ1
is satisfied. This gives us four possible combinations to check for conditions, the
strongest of which will be used to find when such a pH exists. Consider the following
four cases:
1. Assume cH > (cL + 2(V H − V L)) and (cH + 2(V H − V L)) > V H . We have that
cH ≤ V H , which is an initial restriction on pH . Therefore, pH ∈ [cH , V H ] is
plausible given the initial conditions on prices in such a case.
2. Assume cH > (cL + 2(V H − V L)) and (cH + 2(V H − V L)) < V H . Then we
require that
cH ≤ cH + 2(V H − V L)
0 ≤ V H − V L
V L ≤ V H
which is an initial assumption in our model. Therefore, finding a pH to satisfy
the inequality above is plausible in this case.
3. Assume cH < (cL + 2(V H − V L)) and (cH + 2(V H − V L)) < V H . We want that
cL + 2(V H − V L) ≤ cH + 2(V H − V L)
cL ≤ cH
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which is satisfied by our initial assumptions about unit costs. Once again, it is
reasonable to be able to find a pH to satisfy the inequality in this scenario.
4. Assume cH < (cL + 2(V H − V L)) and (cH + 2(V H − V L)) > V H . We want to
show that cL + 2(V H − V L) ≤ V H . This implies that
cL + V H ≤ 2V L
V H + cL
2
≤ V L
V H − cL
2
≤ V L − cL
1
2
≤ V
L − cL
V H − cL .
Therefore, if the condition above is satisfied we can find a pH that satisfies the
original inequality. This is the result that is used for (4.10).
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APPENDIX D
MATLAB CODE
1 % 'Price Signaling in a Two-Market Duopoly'
2 % Numerical Code Version 4.3.0
3 % Matthew Hughes 3/21/2016
4 % This code is meant as a numerical device to provide examples of the
5 % situations discussed in the accompanying thesis.
6 % This code is broken down into several sections, as is the paper.
7 % It will be used only as a tool to implement the ideas discussed
8 % after Section 2 of the paper. The checks and assumptions made in
9 % the paper are used in the development and use of this code to
10 % ensure results are plausible and valid in calculation.
11 % By using selected values for variables, it provides numerical
12 % examples of possible scenarios as well as associated outputs
13 % and conclusions.
14 clear all
15 clc
16 %%
17 %====================================================================
18 % Setting up the Model
19 %====================================================================
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20 % VARIABLE DECLARATION/INITIALIZATION
21 %====================================================================
22 cH = 20; % Unit cost of production for high quality
23 cL = 10; % Unit cost of production for low quality
24 vH = 40; % Consumer valuation of high quality good
25 vL = 30; % Consumer valuation of low quality good
26 alpha = 0; % Probability of firm being high quality
27 rho = 0; % Correlation coefficient, in (0,1)
28 for rho = .1:.3:1 % Loop to change values of rho
29 for alpha = .1:.15:1 % Loop to change values of alpha
30 id = num2str(alpha); % Strings created for naming files
31 id2 = num2str(rho);
32 startfile = ['alpha=' id ' rho=' id2];
33 fid = fopen(startfile, 'w');
34 % Initializing Variables to 0 for use later.
35 pLUnder = 0; % Lowest price charged by low quality firm
36 pLBar = 0; % Highest price charged by low quality firm
37 HEprofit = 0; % Equilibrium profit, for high quality
38 LEprofit = 0; % Equilibrium profit, for low quality
39 %===========================================================
40 % RESTRICTIONS ON VARIABLES
41 % These are checks that are in place to make sure the
42 % calculations work out for all the variables.
43 % They make sure that there will not be paradoxes or invalid
44 % scenarios within the calculations.
45 %===========================================================
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46 % Alpha, eta, lambda must be within [0,1]
47 if (0 > alpha | | 1 < alpha | | 0 > rho | | 1 < rho )
48 fprintf('WARNING: One of alpha or rho is outside the')
49 fprintf('allowed range of [0,1].\n')
50 return
51 end
52 % cH > cL ≥ 0
53 if (cH ≤ cL | | cL ≤ 0 | | cH ≤ 0)
54 fprintf('\nWARNING: One of cL or cH is invalid.\n')
55 fprintf('They must both be ≥ 0 and cH > cL.\n')
56 return
57 end
58 % vH > vL and vL > cL, vH > cH
59 if (vH ≤ vL | | vL ≤ cL | | vH ≤ cH)
60 fprintf('\nWARNING: One of vH or vL is invalid.\n')
61 fprintf('Make sure vH > vL, vH > cH, and vL > cL.\n')
62 return
63 end
64 %%
65 %============================================================
66 % Decisions in First Market
67 %============================================================
68 fprintf(fid,'===========================================\n');
69 fprintf(fid,' FIRST MARKET\n');
70 fprintf(fid,'===========================================\n');
71 % Declaring parameters
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72 fprintf(fid,'\nWe have the following parameters:\n');
73 fprintf(fid,'alpha = %3.2f \t',alpha);
74 fprintf(fid,'cH = $%4.2f \t',cH);
75 fprintf(fid,'vH = $%4.2f \n',vH);
76 fprintf(fid,'rho = %3.2f \t\t',rho);
77 fprintf(fid,'cL = $%4.2f \t',cL);
78 fprintf(fid,'vL = $%4.2f \n',vL);
79 fprintf(fid,'===========================================');
80 % Check if a separating equilibrium exists
81 if (vL - cL)/(vH - cL) ≥ 1/2
82 fprintf(fid,['\nA high quality price pH exists that' ...
83 ' produces a fully revealing equilibrium.\n']);
84 % Calculate range for pH, make sure it is valid
85 theta0 = max(cH,2*(vH-vL)+cL);
86 theta1 = min(2*(vH-vL)+cH,vH);
87 if theta0 > theta1
88 fprintf('\nWARNING: theta0 > theta1.');
89 fprintf(['\nThere is no valid range for pH for a'...
90 ' separating equilibrium.\n']);
91 end
92 % Pick a pH in the existent range, maybe midway
93 pH = (theta0 + theta1)/2;
94 % Calculate price support bounds for low quality
95 pLBar = pH - (vH - vL);
96 pLUnder = pLBar*alpha + cL*(1-alpha);
97 % Make sure pLBar < pH
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98 while pLBar ≥ pH
99 pH = (pH +theta1)/2;
100 end
101 % Equilibrium Profits
102 LEprofit = (pLBar - cL)*alpha;
103 HEprofit = (pH - cH)*(alpha/2);
104 % Conclusion for First Market and Plot
105 fprintf(fid,['\nBy choosing a high quality price of'...
106 '$%4.2f, we find the following:'],pH);
107 fprintf(fid,['\nThere exists a symmetric fully'...
108 ' revealing equilibria where the high' ...
109 ' quality firm charges a deterministic' ...
110 ' price of $%4.2f and all buyers buy' ...
111 ' with \nprobability 1.\n The set of'...
112 ' prices that can be sustained as' ...
113 ' the high quality price pH in any' ...
114 ' such equilibrium is the interval' ...
115 ' from $%4.2f to $%4.2f.']...
116 ,pH,theta0,theta1);
117 fprintf(fid,['\nIn such an equilibrium, the low'...
118 ' quality firms follow a mixed' ...
119 ' strategy with support[$%4.2f,'...
120 ' $%4.2f]. \n The equilibrium per-unit'...
121 ' profits of the high and low quality' ...
122 ' firms are \n$%4.2f and $%4.2f,'...
123 'respectively.'] ...
78
124 ,pLUnder, pLBar, HEprofit, LEprofit);
125 % Create plot of price supports
126 ALPHA = [alpha, alpha];
127 LSup = [pLUnder, pLBar];
128 HSup = [theta0, theta1];
129 figure(1)
130 hold on
131 plot(LSup,ALPHA,'-o','color','red');
132 plot(HSup,ALPHA,'-*','color','blue');
133 set(gca,'fontsize',20)
134 ylim([0,1.1]);
135 legend('Low Quality','High Quality','Location',...
136 'NorthWest');
137 set(legend,'FontSize',14);
138 ylabel('Alpha', 'FontSize', 24)
139 xlabel('Price in Dollars','FontSize', 24)
140 else
141 fprintf(fid,['\nThere is no high quality price pH'...
142 'which guarantees the existence of a'...
143 'separating equilibrium.\n']);
144 end
145 %%
146 %=========================================================
147 % Decisions in Second Market
148 %=========================================================
149 fprintf(fid,'\n\n');
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150 % When firms stay the same types
151 fprintf(fid,'===========================================\n');
152 fprintf(fid,' SECOND MARKET - Staying the Same Type\n');
153 fprintf(fid,'===========================================\n');
154 % Calculate new probability ratio
155 Beta stay =(alpha-rho*alpha+rho)/(alpha - rho*alpha + 2*rho);
156 % Check if a separating equilibrium exists
157 if (vL - cL)/(vH - cL) ≥ (2*Beta stay - 1)/(2*Beta stay)
158 fprintf(fid,['\nA high quality price pH exists that'...
159 ' produces a fully revealing' ...
160 ' equilibrium.\n']);
161 % Calculate range for pH
162 theta0 stay = max(cH,2*Beta stay*(vH-vL)+cL);
163 theta1 stay = min(2*Beta stay*(vH-vL)+cH,vH);
164 if theta0 stay > theta1 stay
165 fprintf('\nWARNING: theta0 > theta1.');
166 fprintf(['\nThere is no valid range for pH for'...
167 ' a separating equilibrium.\n']);
168 end
169 % Pick a pH in the existent range, maybe midway
170 pH stay = (theta0 stay + theta1 stay)/2;
171 % Adjust pLUnder and pLBar
172 pLBar stay = pH stay - (vH - vL);
173 pLUnder stay = pLBar stay*(alpha - rho*alpha + rho)...
174 + cL*(1 - alpha + rho*alpha - rho);
175 % Make sure pLBar < pH
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176 while pLBar stay ≥ pH stay
177 pH stay = (pH stay +theta1 stay)/2;
178 end
179 % Expected unit-profits
180 HEprofit stay = ((alpha - rho*alpha)/2)*(pH stay - cH);
181 LEprofit stay =(alpha+rho*(1-alpha))*(pLBar stay - cL);
182 % Conclusion for 2nd Market and Plot
183 fprintf(fid,['\nBy choosing a high quality price of'...
184 ' $%4.2f, we find the following:']...
185 ,pH stay);
186 fprintf(fid,['\nThere exists a symmetric fully'...
187 'revealing equilibria where the high'...
188 ' quality firm charges a deterministic'...
189 ' price of $%4.2f and all buyers buy'...
190 ' with probability 1.\n The set of'...
191 ' prices that can be sustained as' ...
192 ' the high quality price pH in any'...
193 ' such equilibrium is the interval'...
194 ' from $%4.2f to $%4.2f.']...
195 ,pH stay,theta0 stay,theta1 stay);
196 fprintf(fid,['\nIn such an equilibrium, the low'...
197 ' quality firms follow a mixed'...
198 ' strategy with support' ...
199 ' [$%4.2f, $%4.2f]. \nThe equilibrium'...
200 ' per-unit profits of the high and'...
201 ' low quality firms are \n$%4.2f' ...
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202 ' and $%4.2f, respectively.']...
203 ,pLUnder stay, pLBar stay, ...
204 HEprofit stay, LEprofit stay);
205 % Plot 2nd market 'stay' case results
206 LSup stay = [pLUnder stay, pLBar stay];
207 HSup stay = [theta0 stay, theta1 stay];
208 figure(2)
209 hold on
210 plot(LSup stay,ALPHA,'-o','color','red');
211 plot(HSup stay,ALPHA,'-*','color','blue');
212 set(gca,'fontsize',20)
213 ylim([0,1.1]);
214 legend('Low Quality','High Quality','Location',...
215 'NorthWest');
216 set(legend,'FontSize',14);
217 ylabel('Alpha', 'FontSize', 24)
218 xlabel('Price in Dollars', 'FontSize', 24)
219 else fprintf(fid,['\nThere is no high quality price'...
220 'pH which guarantees the existence'...
221 'of a \nseparating equilibrium.\n']);
222 end
223 %%
224 fprintf(fid,'\n\n');
225 fprintf(fid,'========================================\n');
226 fprintf(fid,' SECOND MARKET - Both Firms Change Type\n');
227 fprintf(fid,'========================================\n');
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228 % Calculate new probability ratio
229 Beta change = (alpha-rho*alpha)/(alpha - rho*alpha - rho);
230 if ((vL - cL)/(vH - cL) ≥ ...
231 (2*Beta change-1)/(2*Beta change) ...
232 && rho < alpha/(1+alpha))
233 fprintf(fid,['\nA high quality price pH exists'...
234 ' that produces a fully revealing'...
235 'equilibrium.\n']);
236 % Calculate range for pH
237 theta0 change = max(cH,2*Beta change*(vH-vL)+cL);
238 theta1 change = min(2*Beta change*(vH-vL)+cH,vH);
239 if theta0 change > theta1 change
240 fprintf('\nWARNING: theta0 > theta1.');
241 fprintf(['\nThere is no valid range for pH'...
242 ' for a separating equilibrium.\n']);
243 end
244 % Pick a pH in the existent range, maybe midway
245 pH change = (theta0 change + theta1 change)/2;
246 % Adjust pLUnder and pLBar
247 pLBar change = pH change - (vH - vL);
248 pLUnder change = ...
249 pLBar change*(alpha-rho*alpha+rho)...
250 + cL*(1 - alpha + rho*alpha - rho);
251 % Make sure pLBar < pH
252 while pLBar change ≥ pH change
253 pH change = (pH change +theta1 change)/2;
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254 end
255 % Expected unit-profits
256 HEprofit change =((alpha-rho*alpha)/2)*(pH change-cH);
257 LEprofit change =(alpha+rho*(1-alpha))*(pLBar change-cL);
258 % Conclusion for 2nd Market and Plot
259 fprintf(fid,['\nBy choosing a high quality price of'...
260 ' $%4.2f, we find the following:'] ...
261 ,pH change);
262 fprintf(fid,['\nThere exists a symmetric fully' ...
263 ' revealing equilibria where the high'...
264 ' quality firm charges a deterministic'...
265 ' price of $%4.2f and all buyers buy'...
266 ' with probability 1.\nThe set of prices'...
267 ' that can be sustained as the high'...
268 ' quality price pH in any such'...
269 ' equilibrium is the interval from' ...
270 ' $%4.2f to $%4.2f.'],...
271 pH change,theta0 change,theta1 change);
272 fprintf(fid,['\nIn such an equilibrium, the low'...
273 ' quality firms follow a mixed strategy'...
274 ' with support[$%4.2f, $%4.2f].'...
275 '\nThe equilibrium per-unit profits of'...
276 ' the high and low quality firms are'...
277 '\n$%4.2f and $%4.2f, respectively.']...
278 ,pLUnder change,pLBar change,...
279 HEprofit change, LEprofit change);
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281 % Plot 2nd market 'change' case results
282 LSup change = [pLUnder change, pLBar change];
283 HSup change = [theta0 change, theta1 change];
284 figure(3);
285 hold on
286 plot(LSup change,ALPHA,'-o','color','red');
287 plot(HSup change,ALPHA,'-*','color','blue');
288 set(gca,'fontsize',20)
289 ylim([0,1.1]);
290 legend('Low Quality','High Quality','Location',...
291 'NorthWest');
292 set(legend,'FontSize',14);
293 ylabel('Alpha', 'FontSize', 24)
294 xlabel('Price in Dollars', 'FontSize', 24);
295
296 else fprintf(fid,['\nThere is no high quality price'...
297 ' pH which guarantees the existence'...
298 ' of a \nseparating equilibrium.\n']);
299 end
300 fclose(fid);
301 end
302 if rho == .1 % Create labeling for 2nd market based
303 r = 'Low'; % on value of rho. These are those attained
304 elseif rho == .4 % in line 41 ('for' loop of rho).
305 r = 'Med';
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306 elseif rho == .7
307 r = 'High';
308 else
309 r = 'Perfect';
310 end
311 if (vL - cL)/(vH - cL) ≥ (2*Beta stay - 1)/(2*Beta stay)
312 figure(2)
313 name = ['Market2Stay ' r ' corr'];
314 saveas(gcf,name,'png') % Save results, clear figure
315 clf(2)
316 end
317 if ((vL - cL)/(vH - cL) ≥ (2*Beta change-1)/(2*Beta change) ...
318 && rho < alpha/(1+alpha))
319 figure(3)
320 name = ['Market2Change ' r ' corr'];
321 saveas(gcf,name,'png') % Save results, clear figure
322 clf(3)
323 end
324 end
325 figure(1)
326 saveas(gcf,'Market1','png') % Save results, clear figure
327 clf(1)
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